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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Whether for good or ill, managers often have in￿uence well beyond their tenure
in a job. Examples are so numerous as to be commonplace. According to Chan-
dler (1977), the American railroad network took its modern form by the 1880s
and ￿...salaried career executives played a critical role in the system building
of the 1880s￿ (p167). Irreversible investment decisions aside, a theme of Peters
and Waterman (1982) is that eﬀective managers inculcate an enduring culture.
Typical is the quote of Richard Deupree, former CEO of Procter and Gamble,
￿William Procter and James Gamble realized that the interests of the orga-
nization and its employees were inseparable. That has never been forgotten.￿
(p76).
The common element here and much more generally is that since employees
at all levels have limited ownership of their own output, a ￿rm may continue to
bene￿tf r o ma ne m p l o y e e ￿ sp a s te ﬀorts even if they quit. This feature evidently
aﬀects employees￿ bargaining position with employers and hence the incentives
of both parties to make non-contractible investments in the relationship. The
underlying perspective is the property rights theory of the ￿rm (PRT). This bold
attempt to explain patterns of industrial organization by the incentive eﬀects
of asset ownership can be applied to all sorts of on make-or-buy decisions. The
seminal papers are Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
henceforth GHM. They argue that costly veri￿cation of relationship-speci￿c
investment means that contracts are necessarily incomplete and can always be
renegotiated. Eventual payoﬀs, and consequently the ex ante incentive to invest,
are therefore determined by ex post bargaining. As ownership of non-human
assets aﬀects bargaining power, ownership ultimately in￿uences the ex ante
incentive to invest. The boundary of the ￿r m( t h a ti s ,t h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ha s s e t s
are under common ownership) is thus determined by the ownership structure
that provides the best bundle of investment incentives.
The concern of this paper is with the neglected but pervasive feature that one
party￿s investment often creates bene￿t sf o rt h eo t h e re v e ni ft h er e l a t i o n s h i p
breaks down. This is particularly likely to apply when the asset is work in
progress or reputational capital, but can also easily arise with other assets. The
remainder of the paper shows that such spillovers have major implications for
PRT.
Perhaps the central result of GHMs formulation is that a party acquiring
additional assets does not suﬀer a decrease in its investment incentives1.T os e e
this, suppose that there are two parties, A and B, and one asset. All that can be
contracted over is ownership of the asset.2 GHM assume that the ￿nal surplus
is shared ex post according to the Nash bargaining solution, i.e. each party
gets its disagreement utility3 plus half of the diﬀerence between total surplus
and the sum of the disagreement utilities. Thus, 50% of the marginal return of
1This result is formally stated and proved as Proposition 1 below.
2T h em o r eg e n e r a lc a s ew i t hn managers is dealt with by Hart and Moore(1990).
3Disagreement utilities are the payoﬀs available to the two parties while negotiations over
the division of the surplus take place.
1the investment stems from the eﬀect of the investment on total surplus, while
another 50% stems from its eﬀect on the disagreement utility. Now, if A owns
the asset, the marginal return of her investment outside the relationship will be
higher as compared to the situation where B controls the asset. Therefore, her
investment incentives will be higher. This is GHM.
The qualitative predictions of PRT do not appear to be especially robust.
Two recent papers, Chiu (1998) and de Meza and Lockwood (1998), note
that the Nash bargaining solution obtains in a non-cooperative Rubinstein
alternating-oﬀer game only if the disagreement utilities are interpreted as ￿inside
options￿, that is they can only be consumed during negotiations. For example,
the parties may be in paid employment which they will quit once agreement is
reached. In practice, the disagreement utilities relevant for PRT may be ￿out-
side options￿. That is, they are payoﬀs achievable by taking up some alternative
oﬀer which scuppers the relationship under negotiation.
As emphasized by de Meza and Lockwood, under these circumstances extra
asset ownership may demotivate managers. When parties can irrevocably break
oﬀ bargaining and take up some new opportunity (and under an additional
assumption on the sequential order of moves) the subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the Rubinstein game satis￿es the outside-option principle. In its simplest
form, this principle says that if the outside-option utility of one party is larger
than 50% of the total surplus from cooperation, then this party will only get
its outside option-utility, while the other party will get all of the additional
social surplus. It is easy to see that with the outside -option principle, GHM￿s
conclusion fails. Suppose that the outside-option utility of whoever owns the
asset does exceed half of the surplus. Then, if A owns, she will get only her
disagreement utility, so 100% of her investment incentives stem from the eﬀect
of the investment on the outside option. Given GHM￿s additional assumption
that the marginal impact of the investment on the total relationship surplus is
higher than on the outside option, it is clear that A￿s investment incentives are
lower if she owns the asset than if she does not own it.
This paper presents a result below (Proposition 2) which shows that the
foregoing argument applies quite generally4; under some weak assumptions -
which together imply that a manager￿s outside option binds when he owns both
assets i.e. that outside options are suﬃciently valuable - a manager￿s incentive
to invest is maximized when owning no assets.
Although there may be occasions where ownership demotivates, it is im-
4De Meza and Lockwood(1998) show that with outside options, increased ownership mo-
tivates only under rather special conditions namely ; (i) if the manager￿s outside option is
already binding before he is given the asset; or, (ii) if the outside option is initially not bind-
ing on either manager, but becomes binding on the recipient following transfer of the asset,
and the recipient￿s outside option is relatively sensitive to investment (i.e. the return on in-
vestment in the outside option is more than half the return to investment in team production).
See also Chiu(1998) for similar results. Both (i) and (ii) require some asymmetry in the model.
In particular, although both these cases involve the manager gaining the asset investing more,
the manager losing the asset does not invest less (and in the second case invests strictly more).
So even here the investment incentives of one of the managers is at a maximum when they
own no assets.
2plausible that this is the norm. Since in many contexts the relevant alternatives
appear to be outside options and alternating oﬀers a natural baragaining proto-
col, there is a puzzle. This paper oﬀers a solution. It is shown that if managers￿
investments augment the value of the physical asset(s) as well as their own hu-
man capital, the conclusion of the earlier property rights literature (namely,
that asset ownership motivates) can be restored even when the outside option
principle applies.5 This is because the value of investments in physical assets
can be appropriated by the owner of the asset whether or not he works together
with the agent who made the investment.
The mechanism at work is the following. If the team breaks up, the subse-
quent revenue generated by the owner of the asset depends on the investment
made by the non-owner, insofar as that investment is embodied in the physical
asset. In this paper, we call the (marginal) impact of an agent￿s investment
on the individual revenue of the other agent a cross-eﬀect. To illustrate the
qualitative signi￿cance of cross eﬀects for the property-rights theory suppose
the outside option of an asset owner is binding at the bargaining stage so the
non-owner is the residual claimant. With cross-eﬀects, the non-owner￿s mar-
ginal return to investment is now the increase in team revenue less the boost in
the owner￿s outside option due to the cross-eﬀect. The cross eﬀect thus weakens
the non-owner￿s investment incentive since, to the extent investment augments
asset value, it merely serves to strengthen the owner￿s bargaining power. Con-
sequently, if the cross-eﬀect is large enough, ownership may once more motivate
(see Proposition 4 below).
The key ingredient of our approach, that the value of the owner￿s outside
option depends on the investment of the other agent(s), is natural and realistic
in many settings. For example, consider a vertical production relationship such
as that between a car-maker and component supplier.6 Suppose that one of
the assets is a press for making parts of the car body, and that the manager
of the component ￿r mh a si n v e s t e ds o m et i m em a k i n gi m p r o v e m e n t st ot h a t
machine. Then, if the manager of the car-maker owns this asset, in the event
of individual production, (i.e. the managers do not agree to produce the car
together), the manager of the car-making ￿rm obtains some bene￿tf r o mt h e
other manager￿s time investment7. The situation is similar when an employee
5Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) allow investments to augment physical assets but work in
a Nash bargaining framework and are concerned with diﬀerent results.There are also cross
eﬀects in the contracting problems of Che and Hausch (1999) and Segal and Whinston (2000)
but implications for asset ownership are not examined..
6The classic example is Fisher Car Body and General Motors. Klein, Crawford,
and.Alchain, (1978) Williamson (1985) and Hart (1995) argue that the takeover of Fisher by
GM, completed by 1926, was to mitigate hold-up problems. This is disputed by Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber (2000), Coase (2000) and Freeland (2000) who cite transaction cost
savings and coordination bene￿ts. The picture is mixed though. Coase reports that prior to
1926 many plants were owned by GM and leased to Fisher. This suggests that hold-up may
have been an issue. In addition, the merger was prompted by the concern of GM that Fisher
Brothers ￿...paid less attention to the needs of General Motors than General Motors would
have liked￿ (Coase, p.23). This indicates that the ownership change was designed to change
incentives.
7This variant of Hart￿s model is discussed in detail in Section 4.
3makes organizational improvements, or when a scientist makes a discovery but
the company owns the patent8. The ownership issue could also involve who
has the right to work in progress, the value of which generally depends on the
contribution of all team members. In all these cases, even in the presence of
outside options, ownership may enhance incentives.
2A n E x a m p l e
To illustrate these ideas, consider Hart and Moore￿s (1990) now standard ex-
ample of a chef and skipper combining forces to oﬀer a luxury cruise. They
￿rst decide which of them should own the yacht. Next the skipper can make an
unveri￿able investment which raises total cruise revenue. We suppose that this
involves researching charts to provide a particularly suitable itinerary. At this
stage, with prospective team revenue determined, the chef and skipper negotiate
how it should be divided between the two of them. The protocol is alternate
oﬀer bargaining but the outcome of the negotiation depends on the opportu-
nities the two parties face. One possibility is that both parties are currently
employed in other jobs. Once they reach agreement they will quit these jobs
and the income ￿ows they generate. Instead each obtains the agreed share of
cruise income. In this case, income from the current jobs represent inside op-
tions. Bargaining then results in the excess of cruise revenue over the sum of
the inside options being equally split between the parties.
Another possibility is that neither chef nor skipper is presently employed,
but each has alternative opportunities they could take up. Perhaps the chef
c o u l ds i g nu pf o rad i ﬀerent voyage whilst a yacht owning skipper could just
set sail and combine both jobs. If either of these options is taken the original
cruise is oﬀ for good. Now the bargaining involves outside options. The limiting
equilibrium is that the cruise revenue is either equally split or, if one party has
an outside option worth more than half cruise revenue, this is its payoﬀ and the
other party receives the remainder of cruise revenue.9
Resuming the detail of the example, let the skipper￿s unveri￿able investment
serve to raise total cruise revenue from 80 to 100 but involve a personal cost of
11. If the the skipper owns the vessel but works independently he earns 60 if the
investment has been made and 50 otherwise. Without the yacht, the skipper￿s
investment is wasted and he earns 20. If the chef owns the yacht but she works
independently she earns 50, but only 20 if she does not own. So, for now, the
8All these examples assume that the investment of the non-owner augments the physical
capital of the owner of the asset. However, a similar eﬀect might arise if the investment is in
human capital. For example, suppose an engineer trains an assistant to repair the machine
before he leaves.
9Though our preferred interpretation is that the diﬀerence between the cases is the nature
of the opportunities open to the agents, it could be the bargaining protocol that determines
which equilibrium prevails. Suppose that there is a genuine outside option available to each
agent. The bargaining is take-it-or-leave-it but each agent has an equal chance of being the
proposer. Now expected payoﬀs equal the inside option interpretation of the text, or the Nash
axiomatic outcome. So outside options could be consistent with the GHM results but the
bargaining protocol required does not though seem particularly easy to justify.
4individual revenue of the chef is independent of the skipper￿s investment (i.e.
there are no spillovers).
Now consider investment incentives if the independent payoﬀsa r ei n s i d eo p -
tions in the post-investment bargaining or the Nash axiomatic solution applies.
First, suppose the skipper owns the yacht. If he invests, his payoﬀ is 60+0.5(100-
60-20)=70 whereas without investment the payoﬀ is 50+0.5(80-50-20)=55. So,
as 70-55 >11, the investment is undertaken. When the chef owns, the skipper
gets 20+0.5(100-20-50)=35 if he invests, and if he does not, he gets only 20
+0.5(80-20-50)=25. In this case, his gain from investment is less than 11 and
he does not invest. So the eﬃcient investment only takes place if the skipper,
the sole party with an investment choice, is the owner. As income transfers can
be made ex ante, this ownership structure is the one that will be agreed at the
outset. This ￿rst case illustrates the original GHM theory of the ￿rm.
Now consider how matters turn out if the outside option principle applies, as
in de Meza and Lockwood(1998). When the skipper owns the yacht, his outside
option is binding at the bargaining stage, as it is worth more than 50% of team
revenue whether or not he invests. Hence, the skipper gets 60 with investment
and 50 without, and consequently does not invest. When the chef owns, her
outside option binds, and so the skipper gets 80-50=30 without investment and
100-50=50 with, implying that the skipper now wishes to invest. It is now
eﬃcient for the chef to own, because only if the skipper does not own is he
suﬃciently motivated to invest.
Finally, retain the outside option principle, but suppose that when the skip-
per invests, in addition to researching charts (which augments only the skipper￿s
human capital), he also supervises modi￿cations to the keel of the yacht to al-
low easy access to more ports on the itinerary (which augments the value of the
physical asset). This additional work raises the skipper￿s investment cost by 5
taking it to 1610. In the event negotiations breakdown irretrievably, the gain
from easier port access is worth 10 whoever owns the yacht. There are now
cross-eﬀects i.e. the skipper￿s investment augments the value of the yacht to the
chef if the chef owns it.
So, if the chef owns and the skipper invests, the chef￿s outside option in-
creases from 50 to 60. Therefore, when the chef owns, the skipper￿s gain from
investing is now only (100-60)-(80-50)=10, less than the cost of investment of
11+5=16. On the other hand, when the skipper himself owns, investment raises
his now raises his outside option from 50 to 70, more than the investment cost
of 16. So, we are back to the original GHM conclusion, i.e. the skipper can only
be suﬃciently motivated to invest if he owns.
3 The Model
Our model can be thought of as an extension of Hart￿s (1995, ch2) widget model,
to accommodate cross-eﬀects. There are two managers i =1 ,2 engaged in a
10We suppose for simplicity that investment is still binary i.e. either the skipper undertakes
both the keel adjustment and the chart research, or neither.
5vertical production relationship using two indivisible assets a1,a 2. Speci￿cally, 2
w o r k sw i t ha na s s e ta2 to produce a widget which is then passed to 1 who works
with a1 to produce a ￿nal output (interpret a1,a 2 as machines (or factories)
that make the ￿nal product and the widget respectively). Investments at levels
e1,e 2 ,0 ≤ ei < ∞, are made by managers 1,2 at date 0 and the widget is
supplied at date 1.
Following Hart, we interpret investments e1,e 2 as being money or time spent
improving the eﬃciency of the relevant manager￿s operation. There is uncer-
tainty about the type of the widget manager 1 requires, which is resolved at date
1; consequently, an eﬀective long-term contract is impossible. Rather, at date
1, the parties negotiate about the widget price and type from scratch. Finally,
both parties are risk-neutral and have unlimited wealth so that it is feasible for
e a c hp a r t yt oo w na n ya s s e tt h a ti si te ﬃcient for him to own.
The ￿rst possibility is that the managers trade a ￿specialized￿ widget, an
event we refer to as team production. In this case, manager 1 gets payoﬀ R(e1)−
p∗,w h e r ep∗ is the price - negotiated at date 1- at which they trade, and R is
the revenue from the sale of the widget. Similarly, manager 2 gets a payoﬀ
p∗ − C(e2), where C is the cost of producing the widget. So, the total pro￿t
(ignoring investment costs) from team production is Π = R − C. We assume
that R is strictly concave and diﬀerentiable in e1 and C is strictly convex and
diﬀerentiable in e2.
The second possibility is that the two managers do not agree to trade, an
event we call individual production. Let the payoﬀs to individual production
be π1,π2. It is central to the property rights theory that π1 (resp. π2) depend
also on the set of assets that manager 1 (resp. manager 2) owns11.F o l -
lowing Hart(1995), we consider two possible allocations of assets between the
managers; non-integration, where manager 1 owns a1, and manager 2 owns
a2, and integration, where one manager owns both assets (there are obviously
two possibilities here). Formally, an asset allocation is a pair (α1,α 2) where
αi ∈ {∅,{ai},{a1,a 2}} is the set of assets owned by i =1 ,2. L e tt h es e to fa l l
possible asset allocations be A. So, we write πi(e1,e 2,α i) to denote the value of
individual production to i under diﬀerent asset allocations.
In modelling individual production, we wish to capture cross-eﬀects. In
Hart(1995), there are no cross-eﬀects i.e. π1 is independent of e2,a n dπ2 is
independent of e1. One way of interpreting this is the following. Hart assumes
that the two managers have an additional input to production other than the
non-contractible investments, which he calls ￿human capital￿ (Hart(1995), p36).
It is an implicit assumption in Hart that in the absence of 2￿s human capital, 1
simply cannot produce a widget, and similarly, in the absence of 1￿s human cap-
ital, 2 simply cannot produce the ￿nal product. So, with individual production,
there is no way for manager 1 to bene￿tf r o mt h ei n v e s t m e n te2 that manager 2
has made in improving the eﬃciency of the asset a2 which is used to make the
widget (and vice-versa).
11Recall that in the example discussed in the previous section, the individual revenue of
either the skipper or the chef depended on whether that agent owned the yacht.
6Here, we relax this assumption. Speci￿cally, we will assume that if manager 1
owns a2 as well as a1,h ecan make a widget, and thus bene￿tf r o m2 ￿ si n v e s t m e n t
e2 in asset a2 (and symmetrically, if manager 2 owns both assets, he can make
the ￿nal product, and thus bene￿t from 1￿s investment in the ￿rst asset). This
implies that with integrated asset ownership, there will be cross-eﬀects, but not
otherwise. A more general formulation is that spillovers occur even under non
integration. For example, the team members may work in close proximity so
that an innovation introduced by one may be observed and applicable by the
other. So manager 1￿s investment e1 improves the eﬃciency of asset a2 as well
as that of asset a1, and similarly for manager 2.As we note after Proposition
3, this extension does not upset our main results, but to avoid clutter we work
with the simpler case.
The details are as follows. We will suppose that the investments e1,e 2 consist
in part of modi￿cations to the assets (machines) a1,a 2, and we denote by 0 ≤
λ2 < 1 the fraction of 2￿s investment that is embodied in the widget-making
machine (perhaps 2 has made some improvement to the speed or reliability of
the machine) and similarly denote by 0 ≤ λ1 < 1 the fraction of 1￿s investment
that is embodied in the machine that produces the ￿nal product. So, in the
event that team production does not take place, manager 1 has ￿access￿ to
investment λ2e2 of manager 2, and similarly for manager 2. Parameters λ1,λ 2
are crucial in what follows.
Now suppose that team production does not take place. If 1 owns both ma-
chines, he has three options. First, he can buy a standard widget at price p and
produce ￿nal output. Second, he can produce a standard widget with machine
a2, and use it in conjunction with a1 to produce ￿nal output. Third, he can
produce his own specialized widget with machine a1, and use it in conjunction
with a2 to produce ￿nal output.
Denote the revenues from the second stage of individual production using
specialized and standard widgets by r(e1), e r(e1) respectively. Also, from the
de￿nition of λ2 above, the costs to 1 of producing a specialized and standard
widget with asset a2 are c(λ2e2), ￿ c(λ2e2). It is natural to assume that revenue
is higher if a specialized widget is used, and that such a widget is more costly
to produce (i.e. r>￿ r, c>￿ c), but neither of these assumptions is necessary
in what follows. All we assume12 is that if 1 owns both assets, he prefers to
produce the specialized rather than the standard widget, no matter what the
investment levels.
Second, if 1 has only asset a1, he can only buy a standard widget and
produce the ￿nal good using this widget, or remain inactive. Finally, we suppose
that without either machine, agent 1 can produce nothing13. A convenient
simplifying assumption is that ￿ r(0) >p>￿ c(0) i.e. it is always better for
manager 1 to buy a standard widget and produce the ￿nal output if he owns a1,
rather than remain inactive, and for manager 2 to produce and sell the standard
12Formally, we assume r(e1) − c(λ2e2) > ￿ r(e1) − ￿ c(λ2e2), all e1,e 2.
13This assumption seems very weak; the discussion in Hart(1995) makes it clear that in the
model, assets are to be thought of as necessary for team production, so we simply assume the
same of individual production.
7widget if he owns a2, rather than stay inactive. So, using above assumptions,
the net revenue to manager 1 in these three cases is;
π1(e1,e 2 : {a1,a 2})=r(e1) − c(λ2e2) (1)
π1(e1,e 2 : {a1})= ￿ r(e1) − p
π1(e1,e 2 : ∅)=0
By similar arguments, we can write down the net revenue for manager 2 in
the event that no team production takes place. If he has no assets, he cannot
produce anything. If he only has the second asset, it is both feasible and optimal
for him to produce a standard widget for sale to the spot market. If he has both
assets, he has the same three options as manager 1 did in the same case, the only
diﬀerence being that 2 only bene￿ts from fraction λ1 of 1￿s investment. Also, we
assume14 that if 2 owns both assets, he prefers to produce a specialized rather
than a standard widget. So, we have;
π2(e1,e 2 : {a1,a 2})=r(λ1e1) − c(e2) (2)
π2(e1,e 2 : {a2})=p − ￿ c(e2)
π2(e1,e 2 : ∅)=0
We assume that r, ￿ r are increasing and strictly concave, and c,￿ c are decreasing
and strictly convex, in their arguments.
We now turn to the key issue of cross-eﬀects. As remarked above, with
integrated ownership, there are cross-eﬀects as long as λ1,λ 2 > 0 i.e.
∂π1(e1,e 2 : a1,a 2)
∂e2
= −λ2c0(λ2e2) > 0,
∂π2(e1,e 2 : a1,a 2)
∂e1
= λ1r0(λ1e1) > 0
(3)
On the other hand, with non-integration, there are no cross-eﬀects15.W h e n
agent 1 owns only asset a1, he must buy a widget from the spot market at price
p, (and similarly for 2) and so the payoﬀ to manager i from individual production
is independent of j0s investment. So, we have the important observation that
in a fully speci￿ed model, cross-eﬀects are determined endogenously by the
structure of asset ownership.
Finally, note that when λ1,λ 2 =0 , our model is almost the same16 as that
of Hart(1995). Any diﬀerences are super￿cial, in the sense that the key assump-
14F o r m a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tr(λ1e1) − c(e2) > ￿ r(λ1e1) − ￿ c(e2), all e1,e 2.
15Of course, it is possible to envisage situations where there are cross-eﬀe c t se v e nw i t hn o n -
integration. In our setting, this would occur when the investment of either agent augmented
the productivity of both assets. The main results of the paper extend to this case, because
the main mechanism at work would not change i.e. an increase in investment by the redisual
claimant would still increase the outside option of the other agent by more, the greater the
number of assets owned by the other agent.
16There are only two inessential diﬀerences. In Hart, agents engaged in individual produc-
tion are assumed transact on the spot widget market, whatever assets they own. By contrast,
in our model, (i) when an agent owns both assets, he ￿nds it both feasible and pro￿table to
make the specialized widget and use it as an input, and (ii) an agent with no assets cannot
produce at all.
8tions in Hart￿s model are also satis￿ed in our model, as we now show. The
assumptions17 on Π,π1,π2 made in Hart-Moore(1990) and Hart(1995) are:
Assumption 1. Π >π 1 + π2, all e1,e 2,a l l(α1,α 2) ∈ A.
This assumption implies that team production will always take place. For As-
sumption 1, it is suﬃcient that R(e) − C(e0) >r (e) − c(e0), all e,e0. The jus-
ti￿cation for this is the same as in Hart(1995), namely that with individual









∂ei ≥ 0, all e1,e 2.
This says that the marginal return to investment in individual production is
(weakly) increasing in the number of assets owned, and is always strictly less
than the marginal return to investment in the relationship. Also, at least one
of the weak inequalities in Assumption 2 should hold strictly for the PRT to be
non-trivial. For Assumption 2 to be satis￿ed, we require that r0(e) ≥ ￿ r0(e) ≥
0,c 0(e) ≤ ￿ c0(e) ≤ 0 i.e. investment by manager 1 has a higher marginal return
if the ￿nal product is made using a specialized widget, and similarly investment
by manager 2 has a higher marginal return if the specialized widget is produced.
The assumptions made so far imply the following useful intermediate result.
Lemma 1. The payoﬀ to individual production πi is non-decreasing in the
number of assets owned by i.
This result follows directly from (1)-(2) and the assumption that ￿ r(0) >p>
￿ c(0).
The order of events is as follows. First, the non-contractible investments
e1,e 2 are made. Then, once investments are made, agents bargain over the
revenue from team production. Finally, production and consumption take place.
We solve the model backwards in the usual way to locate the subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
4 Bargaining
The way in which the revenue from team production is divided up depends on
the assumed bargaining protocol i.e. the rules of the bargaining game. One
way to think of the two alternatives studied in this paper is to think of both
as bargaining games whose basic structure is alternating-oﬀers. In GHM, a
protocol is assumed which eﬀectively treats π1,π2 as inside options. That is,
each agent gets πi per period while bargaining over the division of Π.T h e
interpretation of this is that the two agents can engage in individual production
whilst bargaining; this may be an appropriate assumption in some cases.
17Our Assumption 1 corresponds to part of Assumption 2 of Hart-Moore(1990), and As-
sumption 2.1 of Hart(1995). Our Assumption 2 corresponds to Assumption 6 of Hart-
Moore(1990), and Assumptions 2.2, 2.3 of Hart(1995).
9In this case, in the limit as the discounting goes to zero, it is well-known
(e.g. Sutton(1986)) that the equilibrium payoﬀ for each party is the inside











Π − π1 − π2⁄
(5)
where we have suppressed the dependence of v1,v2 on (α1,α 2) for convenience.
By contrast, more recent work by De Meza and Lockwood(1998) and Chiu(1998)
assume a bargaining protocol where π1,π2 are outside options. Here, it is as-
sumed that agents cannot engage in individual production while bargaining.
Rather, in any bargaining round, the responder may irrevocably leave the bar-
gaining process and commence individual production. In this case, it is well-
known (Binmore, Shaked and Sutton(1989), Sutton(1986)), that in the limit
as the common rate of discounting goes to zero, the equilibrium payoﬀsa tt h e
bargaining stage may be characterized as follows.
Given some arbitrary investment levels (e1,e 2), and asset ownership struc-
ture (α1,α 2),s a yi0s outside option is binding,i f
Π(e1,e 2)
2
<π i(e1,e 2,α i)
Then, if neither outside option is binding, each manager gets Π/2. If 1￿s outside
option is binding, then he gets π1, and manager 2 gets Π−π1 i.e. 2 is ￿residual
claimant￿. If 2￿s outside option is binding, then he gets π2, and manager 1
gets Π − π2 i.e. 1 is ￿residual claimant￿. By Assumption 1, these are the only
possibilities. Let these payoﬀsa sf u n c t i o n so fe1,e 2 be w1(e1,e 2),w 2(e1,e 2).
5 Results on Investment and Asset Ownership
We begin with the inside option case. At date 0, managers 1 and 2 choose e1 and
e2 respectively to maximize their payoﬀs net of investment costs, v1(e1,e 2)−e1,
v2(e1,e 2)−e2 (we have set the unit cost of each type of investment to unity for
convenience). Note from inspection of (4),(5) and the properties of Π,π1,π2 that
the optimal e1 is independent of e2 and vice versa. So, for each asset allocation,
by the strict concavity of r, ￿ r,R, and the strict convexity of c,￿ c,C, there will be
a unique pair of optimal investments e∗
1,e ∗
2. Note also that - crucially - e∗
1,e ∗
2
depend on the asset allocation. As remarked above, Hart￿s(1995) widget model
is eﬀectively a special case of our model without cross-eﬀects (i.e. λ1,λ 2 =0 ).
In that case, we know that when the payoﬀs from individual production are
inside options, investment is increasing in asset ownership (se e.g. De Meza and
Lockwood(1998) ) This ￿rst result extends straightforwardly when cross-eﬀects
are introduced.
Proposition 1 With inside options, manager 1￿s (resp. 20s)i n v e s t m e n te∗
1
(resp. e∗
2) is (weakly) increasing in the number of assets he owns, even when
10cross-eﬀects are present. Moreover, the larger the cross-eﬀects λ1,λ2 the lower
is investment by the non-owner under integrated ownership.
Proof. Consider ￿rst manager 1. The general formula for his payoﬀ gross of in-
vestment cost is given by (4) i.e. v1(e1,e 2)=π1+ 1
2
£
Π − π1 − π2⁄
. Substituting
in our formulae for π1,π2,w eg e t
v1(e1,e 2;a1,a 2)=r(e1) − c(λ2e2)+0 .5(R(e1) − C(e2) − r(e1)+c(λ2e2)) (6)
v1(e1,e 2;a1)=e r(e1) − p +0 .5(R(e1) − C(e2) − e r(e1)+e c(e2)) (7)
v1(e1,e 2;∅)=0 .5(R(e1) − C(e2) − r(λe1)+c(e2)) (8)
in obvious notation. So, if manager 1 owns both assets, from (6), his optimal





















The ￿rst result then follows from (9)-(11), the concavity properties of R,r, ￿ r,
and Assumption 2 in the context of the cross-eﬀects model i.e. r0 ≥ ￿ r0 ≥ 0. Also,
the solution to (11) is clearly decreasing in λ1. A similar argument applies for
manager 2. ⁄
This result shows that the most basic implication of the inside option bar-
gaining protocol is that asset ownership motivates, and moreover, this conclusion
is robust to the introduction of cross-eﬀects. Note that the higher is λ1 or λ2, the
lower is the investment by the non-owner. Intuitively, with a cross-eﬀect, more
investment by the non-owner simply increases the owner￿s inside option, and
therefore his bargaining power, and the stronger the cross-eﬀect, the stronger
this loss of bargaining power for the non-owner is.
We now turn to the case of outside options. In this case, the payoﬀsi n
the investment stage are w1(e1,e 2) − e1,w 2(e1,e 2) − e1. Contrary to the in-
side option case, there is strategic interaction at the investment stage in that
optimal investment for 1 depends on 2￿s investment and vice-versa (De Meza
and Lockwood (1998)). We will assume throughout that there is a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium e∗
1,e ∗
2 to this investment game, conditional on a given
asset allocation. Building on results of De Meza and Lockwood (1998), we show
in Appendix A that a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a unique pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is that r0 be suﬃciently close to R0/2, and that c0 be
suﬃciently close to C0/2. That is, the return to the investment in the outside
option for either manager must not be too high or too low relative to the return
to the investment in the productive relationship.









Of course, which, if either, outside option is binding in equilibrium depends on
the asset allocation. We now make one more, quite weak assumption:
Assumption 3. F o re i t h e rm a n a g e r , there exists an asset allocation such that
his outside option is binding in equilibrium.
This is quite a weak assumption. It rules out (i) a trivial case, where neither
manager￿s outside option ever binds, in which case asset ownership can never
aﬀect investment, or (ii) the case where the model is highly asymmetric. Under
these assumptions, we can now get the following general result about the eﬀect
of asset ownership on investment:
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and there are no cross-eﬀects
(λ1,λ 2 =0 ). With outside options, the investment of either manager is strictly
higher when he has no assets than two assets, and weakly higher when he owns
no assets rather than one.
Proof. (i) We ￿rst show that if a manager owning a single asset has a binding
outside option in equilibrium, the option also binds when the manager owns
both assets.
Let the equilibrium investments when manager 2 owns one asset be (e∗
1,e ∗
2).If
the acquisition of the extra asset leads to an equilibrium in which 2￿s outside
option still binds, 1￿s investment must be unchanged at e∗
1.W i t h t w o a s s e t s ,
2 invests more given 1￿s investment. Let the new investment level be e0
2 >e ∗
2.
The question is whether e0
2 could be so great that 2￿s outside option no longer
binds. To show that it could not, suppose the contrary. Compare 2￿s payoﬀ
at (e∗
1,e 0
2) with one asset and with two. In either case, neither parties outside
option binds (when 1 owns one asset its outside option does not bind at (e∗
1,e ∗
2)
so it cannot do so at (e∗
1,e 0
2)). Thus at (e∗
1,e 0
2), 2 gets the same payoﬀ with one
or two assets. However, at e∗
2 the payoﬀ to 2 is greater when owning two assets.
Thus with two assets it cannot be pro￿table to invest e0
2.
(ii) It follows that if manager i owns two assets, his outside option must
be binding in equilibrium. For suppose not. Then from (i), his outside option
cannot be binding when he has one asset either. Also, by assumption, his
outside option is zero when he has no assets, and so cannot bind either. But
then Assumption 3 is violated.
(iii) Now consider manager 1. If he has no assets, manager 2 must have both,
and so from (ii), manager 2￿s outside option is binding. Therefore, manager 1￿s
payoﬀ is Π − π2 − e1. The ￿rst-order condition for his optimal investment is
therefore
R0(e1)=1 (12)
12so by Assumption 2, his investment can be no higher under any other allocation
of assets. If manager 1 has both assets, his payoﬀ is π1 − e1, as his outside
option is binding, so the ￿rst-order condition for his optimal investment is
r0(e1)=1 (13)
and so from (12),(13), by Assumption 2, and strict concavity of R,r, his invest-
ment must be strictly lower than when he owns neither asset. The proof for
manager 2 is symmetric. ⁄
This is the most general possible formulation of the idea that with outside
options, asset ownership may demotivate. This result consolidates Propositions
4 and 5 of de Meza and Lockwood(1998), and extends them to the case of
relatively productive outside options18. It also relates to Proposition 3 of Chiu
(1998), which says that if asset transfer causes the manager receiving the asset
to invest strictly more, then the donor invests (weakly) more. So, under the
stated condition, losing an asset motivates, and consequently, under the reverse
asset transfer, the additional asset will demotivate the recipient.
The key focus of this paper is whether, with spillovers, asset ownership
motivates when π1,π2 are outside options. On this question, we have the
following result;
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and that the return to invest-
ment in individual production is relatively high (r0(e) > 0.5R0(e), −c0(e) >
−0.5C0(e), all e). Then, with outside options, when spillovers are suﬃciently
strong (1 >λ 1,λ 2 >λ 0), the investment of either manager is strictly increas-
ing in the number of assets owned, except in the special case where manager i
already owns ai and is given aj and initially, j0s outside option is binding. In
this case, manager i0s investment falls.19
Proof.
(i) Assumption 3 implies that if a manager owns both assets, his outside
option must be binding (see the proof of Proposition 2 above). So, there are
t h r e ep o s s i b l ec a s e s .
Case A: non-integration implies neither manager￿s outside option binding.
Case B1: non-integration has 1￿s outside option binding.
Case B2: non-integration has 2￿s outside option binding.
Case A. By de￿nition, if the return to investment in individual production
is relatively high, then
r0(e) > 0.5R0(e) >R 0(e) − r0(e)
18These occur when the marginal product of investment in individual production is at least
half the marginal product of investment in team production. For a more formal de￿nition,
see Section 4 below.
19If spillovers arise even under non integration (the bene￿ts accrue even to the unowned
machine) the exception may not apply. The spillover lowers manager i0s incentive when
owning only ai and does not reduce incentives when also owning aj.None of the other cases
are qualitatively aﬀected by the more general treatment of spillovers.
13So, for λ1 ’ 1,
r0(e) > 0.5R0(e) >R 0(e) − λ1r0(λ1e) (14)
But the three terms in (14), reading from left to right, are simply the marginal
returns to investment by manager 1 when he owns two, one or no assets re-
spectively. It follows directly from this fact and strict concavity of r,R, that
investment is monotonically increasing the number of assets owned. A similar
argument applies to manager 2.
Case B1. In this case, when 1 owns no assets, 2￿s outside option is binding:
otherwise, 1￿s outside option is binding. So, as manager 1 goes from owning one
to two assets, his return to investment rises from ￿ r0(e1) to r0(e1). By assumption
2, the second return is greater than the ￿rst, so he will invest more with two
assets rather than one. When manager 1 goes from owning one asset to no assets,
his return to investment goes from r0(e1) to R0(e1)−λ1r0(λ1e), as manager 2￿s
outside option is binding. If λ1 is close to one, then r0(e1)−(R0(e1)−λ1r0(λ1e :
)) ’ 2r0(e1) − R(e1) > 0, where the last inequality follows from the fact that
outside options are assumed productive. So, the incentive to invest is higher for
manager 1 when he has one asset than when he has none.
Case B2. When manager 1 goes from owning one asset to no assets, then as
2￿s outside option in either case is still binding, manager 1￿s return to investment
goes from R0(e1) to R0(e1)−λ1r0(λ1e), as only in the second case is there a cross-
eﬀect. So, he will invest more when he owns one asset. When manager 1 goes
from owning one asset to two assets, his return to investment goes from R0(e1)
to r0(e1). So, again he will invest more when he owns one asset. ⁄
So, with cross-eﬀects, the rather general result that in the presence of outside
options asset ownership demotivates is partially reversed; when cross-eﬀects are
suﬃciently strong, giving additional assets to a manager will strictly increase
that manager￿s investment, except in the special case20 identi￿ed in the Propo-
sition. Taking Propositions 1 and 3 together, it follows that if the hypotheses of
Proposition 3 hold, therefore, the eﬀect of transferring ownership of additional
asset(s) to a manager is to induce him to invest more, irrespective of the precise
bargaining protocol.
Can the hypotheses of Proposition 3 all be satis￿ed, and are they also con-
sistent with the conditions for existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium in the investment game, as discussed above? In Appendix B, an
example is presented which shows the mutual consistency of all these assump-
tions.21
Finally, note another novel implication of cross-eﬀects. Introducing cross
eﬀects also creates the possibility that diversi￿ed ownership may be optimal
20In this special case, with non-integration, one manager￿s outside option is binding (say 2￿s)
and thus manager 1 is residual claimant. As there are no cross-eﬀects with non-integration,
the marginal return to 1￿s investment in that case is R0(e1) a n di st h u sa sh i g ha si tc a nb e .
When 1 gets an additional asset (integrated ownership by 1), then 1￿s marginal incentive to
invest must fall.
21If spillovers occur even under non integration.This does not upset Proposition 3. Spillovers
have no eﬀect if outside options are not binding under non integration whilst under integration
all that matters is the total spillovers and not the decomposition across machines.
14even with a binding outside option.22 Suppose that agent 1 works with asset
a1 and agent 2 with asset a2. Let each agent￿s investment increase the value
of the asset they work with but have no eﬀect on the other asset. Suppose
initially that 1 owns both assets and her outside option binds. Now asset a2 is
transferred to manager 2, but this still leaves 1￿s outside option binding. Since
the cross eﬀect is eliminated, 2￿s investment increases whereas 1￿s is unaﬀected.
Diversi￿ed ownership therefore dominates both assets being owned by manager
1. Were ownership concentrated in 2￿s hands it might be that 2￿s outside option
binds, in which case his investment falls relative to the diversi￿ed solution.
Whether 1 invests less depends on the eﬀect on team productivity relative to the
impact on his outside option, but whatever happens to 1￿s investment, diversi￿ed
ownership may be best even though there is a binding outside option.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
GHM explain the pattern of asset ownership by means of an incomplete contract-
ing framework. Ownership matters for ex-ante investment decisions because of
its in￿uence on ex-post bargaining. Their detailed analysis is most naturally
interpreted in terms of the eﬀect of ownership on inside options. Yet in many
instances it is the threat of outside options being exercised that drives ex-post
bargaining. That is the consequences of team members committing to alterna-
tive employment arrangements is the key factor in negotiations. As ownership
enhances a manager￿s opportunities, it may make the threat to break up the
team credible, in which case the owner￿s payoﬀ is determined by the outside
option. The owner￿s incentive to raise the value of their own ￿rm is therefore
dulled. The striking implication is that, for at least one manager, and usually
both, investment incentives are maximized when no assets are owned.23
This paper shows that the demotivating eﬀect of ownership relies on the
assumption that a manager￿s outside option only depends on her own invest-
ments. In many cases this is unrealistic. An owner typically has the right to
continue with a project even if the team dissolves. The investment that the non
owner made to enhance productivity may then be devalued, but is not normally
wholly lost to the project. Indeed, the leading example in the property rights
literature, the widget model, naturally exhibits the cross-eﬀect property under
integrated ownership. This matters, for if at least some of the worker￿s invest-
ment is available to the owner even without cooperation, the bargaining power
of the non owner is weakened, diminishing her incentive to invest. Moreover,
if the owner￿s investment is complementary with the non-human assets, the in-
vestments she makes may be largely preserved if the team breaks up. So, in the
22In de Meza and Lockwood (1998) it is noted that without cross eﬀects, the agent with a
binding outside option should own all the assets. Notice also that cross eﬀects augment the
case for joint ownership which may now boost the non-owners incentives as well as the owners.
Halonen 2002 has an alternative explanation for joint ownership as the regime which in a
repeated game framework, maximises the punishment for deviation from eﬃcient investment..
23The circumstances where this applies to only one manager are given in footnote 3.
15r e a l i s t i cc a s et h a tc r o s se ﬀects are present, the GHM property that ownership
motivates may extend to the case of outside options.
In the paper we have investigated the case in which investment enhances
nonhuman asset value and shown how this implies that, even with outside op-
tions, it may be appropriate to give ownership to the party whose investment
most in￿uences team surplus. This allocation can also arise if, as is possible,
investment decreases asset value. For example, in the skipper-chef story, invest-
ment could involve work on the keel of the boat which makes it faster but at the
same time more likely to keel over without the expertise of the skipper. That is,
the value of the asset is lowered by the investment. Making the chef the boat￿s
owner then gives the skipper an excessive incentive to invest. The reason for
giving ownership to the party with the investment decision is to prevent over
investment.
The most basic claim of PRT is that ownership in￿uences incentives and is
distributed so as to maximise aggregate value added. Empirical work should
therefore examine whether, when the importance of incentivising particular
agents alters, so too does the ownership structure. Beyond this is the ques-
tion of the direction of the eﬀect. Some interesting evidence is provided by
Baker and Hubbard (2002). They ￿nd that the advent of on-board computers
diminishes the problem of incentivising truck drivers with the result that there
are fewer owner drivers. This though begs the question of what bene￿ti n t e -
gration oﬀers. The answer involves outside options. Truck ownership gives the
driver an incentive to seek out opportunities to transport consignments for a
variety of shippers. Indeed, it is privately pro￿table to divert resources into the
establishment and enhancement of such outside options rather than improving
the service to the eventual shipper. Integration, by eliminating this possibil-
ity, improves the eﬃciency of the drivers investment.24 This bene￿tc o m e sa t
a cost. The non-owning driver has less incentive to maintain the vehicle since
such investments spillover almost entirely to the owner. So, even in the presence
of outside options, ownership may, on balance be helpful for incentives. Truck-
ing thus ￿ts into our framework where ownership appears to be driven by the
extent of the spillovers and on the presence of outside options. Ownership is
least motivating in the absence of spillover eﬀects and in the presence of outside
options. As for the latter eﬀect, experimental evidence that ownership is better
for investment incentives when options are inside rather than outside is oﬀered
by Sonnemans, Oosterbeek, and Sloof (2001).
Which is the appropriate combination of assumptions requires case by case
study. To illustrate, we sketch more generally how the ideas developed here
may apply to whether an activity is undertaken in-house by employees rather
than out-house by self-employed contractors.25 The property-rights literature
directs attention to the incentive eﬀects of asset ownership. As often noted, in
￿people￿ businesses there may be few important capital inputs to own yet ￿rms
24This mechanism whereby ownership induces inne￿cient investment in developing outside
options, possible diverting relationship speci￿c investment is discussed in de Meza and Lock-
wood (1998) and involves a minor reformulation of the present model.
25Serious discussion of these issues in began with Coase (1937)
16still arise. We propose that the key asset to focus on is work in progress. What
demarcates employees from the self employed is that they do not own their out-
put. At ￿rst sight this implies that an employee is less protected against hold-up
so has inferior investment incentives than does a self employed contractor. By
threatening to sell output elsewere (a natural outside option) unless a satisfac-
tory price is negotiated, the self-employed contractor seems able to capture a
greater share of the value created. Nevertheless, it does not always follow that
self employment sharpens the worker￿s incentives. The right to seize output
may create a binding outside option for the employer, making the employee the
residual income claimant. This potentially boosts worker incentives relative to
self employment. What creates the ambiguity is that cross eﬀects are intrinsic in
this situation. Employee investment raises the employer￿s outside option, which
depresses the employee￿s incentives. In contrast, the self-employed worker gains
from investment to the extent that her outside option is raised. Application of
our principal result shows that the marginal return to eﬀort may then be greater
for a self-employed contractor with a binding outside option. This occurs if the
value of the outside option is relatively sensitive to investment and is high in
comparison to team surplus, as is likely if the ￿nal product is sold in competitive
markets.
That subcontracting is more likely to prevail in ￿thick￿ markets than in
￿thin￿ is not straightforward though. The speci￿cation of the contractors prod-
uct may be a choice variable. Rather than tailoring the item to the needs of
a particular user, in order to maximise her bargaining power, a subcontractor
has an incentive to produce a generic product which can be sold to a range of
customers. In thick markets with many alternative buyers there could therefore
be more of a problem with subcontractors engaging in costly rent-seeking ac-
tivities. It is precisely because employees have less bargaining power that they
have more incentive to make relationship-speci￿c investments.26
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Appendix A
In this Appendix, we present some suﬃcient conditions for a existence and
uniqueness of a pure-strategy equilibrium in the investment game with outside













, all e1,e 2
and productive if the reverse conditions hold.
Note that in De Meza and Lockwood(1998), it is argued that a pure-strategy
equilibrium, if it exists, in unique, but a proof is presented only for the case of
unproductive outside options. So, this Appendix complements De Meza and
Lockwood(1998) in two ways. First, it provides suﬃcient conditions for the ex-
istence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, and provides an explicit proof that these
conditions are also suﬃcient for uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium in the
case of productive outside options. The results are established for the model of
this paper, which includes the model without cross-eﬀects when λ1,λ 2 =0 .
1. Productive outside options.
We provide an explicit proof only for the case of non-integration: the two
cases of integrated ownership are both similar.27 Throughout, we hold the asset
ownership structure are ￿xed, and so suppress the assets as arguments of the






C0(e2)=1 ,r 0(e1)=1 , −c0(e2)=1
these are optimal investment levels for agents 1,2 when their outside options
are not binding and when they are. Also, we can partition the space of feasible
investment levels (e1,e 2) i.e. <2
+ into three sets: a set B0 where neither outside
option is binding, and sets B1,B 2 where manager 1 or 2￿s outside option is
binding. By A1, B0 is always non-empty: either or both of B1,B 2 may be
empty. The most general case is where all three are non-empty, and it is this
case that we deal with. Let the boundary of B1 and B0 be given28 by the
27Under integration spillovers occur which potentially changes the slope of the regime
boundary. Suppose manager one owns both machines. Consider the boundary between one￿s
outside option binding and no binding outside option. An increase in e1results in her outside
option strictly binding. Were the boundary downward sloping the implication is that to oﬀset
the eﬀect of one￿s extra investment e2 must fall. This works if the marginal eﬀect of e2 is
to boost one￿s outside option by more than double the boost in relationshipsurplus. Then,
in the productive case, the double change in investment levels has raised outside options by
more than the relationship surplus. The standard assumption is that investments are more
productive in the relationship so if this is maintained, spillovers do not change the upward
boundary slope. The argument then goes forward as in the non-integration case with the
troublesome discontinuity in the response function being eliminated as there.




,r (λ1e1) − c(e2)=
R(e1) − C(e2)
2
19function b1(e2), and the boundary of B2 and B0 be given by the function b2(e1).
So, for any e2, (b1(e2),e 2) is a pair of investment levels for which 1￿s outside
option just binds, and for any e1, (e1,b 2(e1)) is a pair of investment levels for
which 2￿s outside option just binds. A simple adaptation of the argument in de
Meza and Lockwood(1998) indicates that b1(e) <b (e2).






b2(e2) if b2(e1) ≤ e2
e1 if b1(e1) ≤ e2 <b 2(e1)
e1 if e2 <b 1(e1)
That is, when e1 = e1, 1￿s outside option is binding, and 1 is choosing optimal
investment given that he gets his outside option payoﬀ r(e1).W h e n e1 = e1,
neither outside option is binding, and 1 is choosing optimal investment given
that he gets half the surplus from joint production. Finally, when b1(e1) ≤ e2, 1
would like to choose the level of investment given that he is residual claimant, i.e.
which solves 1=R0(e1), but this larger level of investment would move the reac-
tion function into region B0 (or possibly B1) where this reaction would no longer
be optimal, and so 1￿s reaction function lies along the boundary between B0 and
B2− for more discussion on this point, see De Meza and Lockwood(1998).











1 e 1 eNote the discontinuity at the point where e2 = b2(e1). Agent 2￿s reaction
function has an identical characterization, with the indices 1 and 2 permuted.
Note also that b1(.),b 2(.) are drawn upward-sloping, although with cross-
eﬀects, this is not necessarily the case.
Assume ￿rst the limit case where r0 = R0/2 and c0 = C0/2 . Then e1 =
e1 =￿ e1, e2 = e2 =￿ e2. It is then clear that neither reaction function g1,g 2 has
a discontinuity. So, it is easy to see that there exists a unique equilibrium.
The following three cases shown below in Figure A2 are exhaustive, and in each
case the equilibrium E is unique. Now perturb the revenue and cost functions
slightly so that r0 >R 0/2 and c0 >C 0/2. Then, as long as ei − ei is not too
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E 2. Unproductive outside options.
This case is dealt with extensively in De Meza and Lockwood(1998). As
noted there (p.373), the investment space can be partitioned into at most two
zones. If there are con￿gurations in which one manager￿s outside option binds
then it is impossible to ￿nd investment levels at which the other manager￿s
outside option binds. There will though be investment levels at which neither
option binds Once again, the assumptions of this paper means spillovers do not
apply under non integration. By the argument of De Meza and Lockwood(1998),
the equilibrium is always unique, and is a pure-strategy equilibrium except in the
case where the reaction functions have the characteristics shown in Figure IIIc
of the paper. So it suﬃces to state a condition that rules out that con￿guration.
This con￿guration relies on the fact that (in the notation of the paper) e1 > ￿ e>
e0 Proceeding as before, assume ￿rst the limit case where r0 = R0/2 eliminating
the discontinuity in the response function thereby creating a unique equilibrium.
Now perturb the revenue functions slightly so that r0 >R 0/2. Then, as long
as e1 − e0 is not too large, the discontinuities in the reaction functions do not
generate additional equilibria.
Turning to integration, the only new ingredient is whether, as a result of
the spillover, the regime boundary is now upward sloping. This requires that
to oﬀset the eﬀect of higher investment by manager one, which would otherwise
render her outside option non binding, manager 2￿s investment must increase
to oﬀset this eﬀect. Were this to be so, a higher investment by 2 boosts the
outside option by more than relationship surplus. This though is contrary to
the assumption of unproductive outside options.
22Appendix B - An Example.




e2,r (e)=R0 − δ +
θ
√
e1, ￿ r(e)=R0 − δ + γ
√
e1,c (e)=C0 + δ − θ
√
e2, ￿ c(e)=C0 + δ − γ
√
e2,
δ,θ,γ > 0, 1 >θ>γand ￿nally, λ1 = λ2 = λ. Note that Assumptions 1-3 are
certainly satis￿ed. Also, investment is relatively productive in the outside option
if θ>0.5. Also, by the argument of Appendix A, pure-strategy equilibrium at
the investment stage of the game exists and is unique if θ ’ 0.5. Finally, (??)
and (??)a r es a t i s ￿ed as θ>γ .
Next, we show that if θ>0.5, and δ is small, Assumption 4 is satis￿ed i.e.
with integrated ownership, the owner￿s outside option is binding for λ suﬃciently
close to 1. Suppose w.l.o.g. that 2 owns both assets. Then his outside option is
binding for some ￿xed e1,e 2 if
r(λe1) − c(e2) >
R(e1) − C(e2)
2
But this reduces to









Now, assuming that it is binding, it is easy to check that the optimal investment











So, substituting (16) back in (15), 2￿s outside option is binding in equilibrium if




λθ)+θ) > 0.5(R0 − C0)+0 .25((1 −
√
λθ)+θ)
which surely holds if δ ’ 0,a n dλ ’ 1,a sθ>0.5.
Finally, we show that for a range of spot prices, the outside options are not
binding in equilibrium with non-integration, as required by Proposition 4. For





e2) ≥ R0 −δ +γ
√
e1 −p, p−C0 −δ +γ
√
e2 (17)
If outside options are not binding in this case, it is easy to check that investment
levels are e1 = e2 =1 /16. So, substituting these values back in (17), and
rearranging, gives
0.5(R0 + C0)+δ +
(1 − γ)
4




So, if p is in the interval (18), then neither outside option is binding, as required.
So, we conclude that all the hypotheses of Propositions 3 are satis￿ed for this
example. ⁄
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